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Why do we« act th« tray we do? What is it that makes ua 
perceive situations as we do? After we have made a decision 
or acted in a given manner, do we know why we did it? Many 
of us, after considering the fsots, make a decision based on 
our valued, our idea of right and wrong and our simple "gut
i
f
feelings". These feelings are the product of all of our life 
experiences. It would then follow that we, as personified by 
our decisions and notions, are the product of our pasts, which 
are our life experiences. This conclusion is not some great 
revelation. Xn fact, any introductory psychology textbook would 
not only stake this abatement, but would proceed to fill the 
better part of four hundred or so pages with fxperiments and 
and ten*year studies to prCve the point, The ^int, however, 
is key to understanding the reasoning and need for this endeavor 
Xn modern America, it seems that our population is net 
content merely to leave the psychoanalysis of others to the 
experts* Instead, everyone from the supermarket tabloids to 
Dr* Ruth suddenly has the answers as to why people behave in 
the ways which they do. Even as Ted Bundy was being executed, 
people were attempting to determine what would make a former 
law school student go on a killing spree. Did he have some 
reprssssfi hostility, towards women? Xf so, what would cause 
something llke that? These types of questions flowed: from news 
anchormen, editorial pages of newspapers, family, friends end .
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just about anyone who took up the subject in conversation.
I do not mean to imply that this type of questioning is 
bad or wrong. On the contrary, it seems that these very 
questions must be studied and analyzed so that we, as a society, 
can take steps which may prevent future Ted Bundy incidents.
But at least one sector of observation (presumably there are 
many more) has gone unnoticed by the watchful eye of the public. 
That is the area of politics and, specifically, of political 
figures and candidates.
Consider this. If we can analyze the actions of Ted Bundy, 
Charles Manson, Jack the Ripper or any other criminal, in a 
systematic, meaningful and efficient manner, then we should 
be able to arrive at some conclusions. Hopefully one of these 
conclusions would be something, or some set of things, in eaoh 
of their pasts that could be linked to their crimes. Of course, 
such links would have to have some plausible explanation. It 
would not suffice to say that since they all had blue kitchen 
curtains, blue curtains made them commit crimes. But if such 
links could be established, then we could attempt to remove 
these precipitating factors. If removal of these factors were 
Impossible, then we could at least try to identify and stop 
such men from committing these horrible crimes. But either 
way, we would be one step ahead just because we knew what these 
links were.
Mow consider the political environment in this country. 
Specifically, consider last year's presidential election. For
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the better part of one year, candidates tossed around issues, 
artfully dodged questions from the press and vaguely stated 
their positions on the issues which the public scorns to oare 
about. We learned about Qeorge Bush wanting to be the "Education 
and Environment President" from his speeches, ten second sound 
bites on the evening news, articles in tho newspaper - and media 
advertisements. Bush and Dukakis muddled around and eventually 
gave us some semblance of a platform, or at least stances on 
key issues. The voting public listened to the two men, mulled 
it over for a while, and then oast their ballot for the man 
with whom they agreed moat. This is the way a representative 
democracy is supposed to work, right? Of course it is, but 
one aspect of the whole situation remains puzzling. The millions 
of Americans who voted for George Bush simply took his word 
for it when he said he wanted to improve the educational system 
of our country. True, there were some who said "But Mr. Bush, 
you were Vice-President in an administration which severely 
cut educational funding. How are we supposed to believe that 
as President you would be very different?", but apparently most 
people chose to ignore those questions.
The point here is threefold. First, a man is a product 
of his past and his life experiences. Second, if it were 
possible for a citizenry to establish links between a man's 
past experiences and his action in the present, then that
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citizenry would be in a position to make a prediction about 
the actions of men in the future based on their individual
experiences. Third/ if this were accomplished, then we could 
rely on more that just someone's word when we are trying to 
figure out what they are going to do in the future.
It is this nerd for some predictor that serves as the 
inspiration and driving force behind this undertaking. The 
focus here is presidential policy, but there seems to be no 
good reason why such a study could not take place in relation 
to almost any aspect of almost any field of study. The object 
of this examination is to answer some of those questions about 
why people behave in the way they do, especially when that 
behavior haB a profound impact on the lives and welfare of a 
large number of other people. The aspect of the presidency 
to be examined here is that of the President's use of the United 
States military. Specifically, the task at hand is as outlined 
below.
Throughout history, the societies of man have engaged in 
warfare. From the earliest stone-throwing, hunter-gatherers 
to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the military 
excursion into Libya, whole populations have resorted to 
destructive force in an attempt to gain that which they desire. 
And although we generally say that Germany and Japan fought 
the United States and its allies, this it not quite accurate 
and needs some clarification.
First, a country is nothing more than a geographical 
boundary and a government to take care of the internal affairs 
and needs of the population. But "country" itself is an abstract
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idea which can no more go to war than it can blow its nose.
It is more accurate to say that it is the people of a country 
who are at war with the people of another country. While this 
is accurate, it might not be accurate to state that the people 
of an entire country declared war on th^ people of another 
country. This idea might be illustrated in a comparison between 
the Vietnam War and World War II. In WWII, there was a great 
outrage among the American population at the Japanese bombing 
of Pearl Harbor and keeping up public support for the war was 
not too difficult. Vietnam, on the other hand was a case study 
in the ways you can be involved in a war and not have much public 
support for that involvement, or at least very divided public 
support. One can imagine that the case of WWII was one in which 
the whole American public declared war on another country, but 
the same statement can hardly be said of the United States' 
involvement in Vietnam. It is important to nota the differences 
between these two cases because it serves to shed light on the 
parties which actually make the decisions to enter a war or 
war-like situation. The governments of our planet's nations 
are the bodies which are actually at war. They are the ones 
who communicate. They are the ones who have disagreements.
And they are the ones who invade, blockade and declare war 
against each other. It is true that these governments are often 
acting in what they consider to be the best interests of their 
people, but the fact remains that it is the governments which 
come into conflict.
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The idea of governments coming into conflict with oach 
other, as opposed to entire populations doing the same, is key 
to the argument and research which will follow. It is key 
because it demonstrates that we are somewhat at the mercy of 
our elected leaders. Cynics will say that we had the chance 
to elect who we wanted during the last elections and we must 
now abide by the decisions of those we placed in office. But 
that is little comfort to the mothers who must watch their 
nineteen year-old sons fly off to some foreign land, not knowing 
if they will ever see them again. Obviously, we must do 
everything we can to place those in office who will best look 
after our general welfare. The objective here is to try to 
establish some criteria by which we, as general citizens, can 
better predict how well a given prospective leader will care 
for our needs. The supposition here is that limited use of 
the United States military, whether it be in a formal state 
of declared war or in a limited act of aggression, is a better 
course for a President to take than to liberally use the 
military. This is because military aggression, while sometimes 
necessary and/or unavoidable, endangers the lives of our 
servicemen and also sets the stage for an escalation of the 
conflict which could endanger the lives of many more servicemen 
and possibly even the lives of civilians at home. We are, 
therefore, searching for some indicators which will be useful 
in predicting the propensity of the President of the United 
States to commit U.8. troops to warlike conditions.
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There are three factors which will be examined in order 
to try to shed some light on the military use question* The 
first of these factors is the budgeting practices of the 
presidents* The other two factors are more internal in nature. 
They are the military experience and exposure of the presidents 
and their socio-economic backgrounds. These are described as 
internal because they are factors from a man’s past which rhape 
his judgment and require a fair amount of theory and 
hypothesizing to understand. The budgeting issue, on the other 
hand, is one which can easily be quantified and requires little 
effort to interpret the results other than a simple comparison 
of numbers. The reasons for choosing these factors as possible 
predictors will be discussed in depth in Jiter chapters. 
Meanwhile the first task at hand is the evaluation of each 
President to determine whether or not he is a “military use" 
president.
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CHAPTER 1i Just Who Are The Miiltary Presidenta?
The United States of America has been involved in world 
affairs and, in some cases armed conflict, for almost the 
entirety of its existence. By virtue of the Constitution, the 
president is the commander-in-chief our military. And while 
an act of Congress is required to declare war, there are many 
examples of military excursions which were not only not 
sanctioned by Congress, but were carried out (or at leasi begun) 
without Congress knowing of the affair. This can occur because 
the framers of the Constitution had the foresight to allow the 
president to act or react quickly as world events dictated 
without the need to engage in the cumbersome and time-consuming 
task of a congressional declaration of war. This same privilege 
is evident when the United States is engaged in declared war.
The president can order troops into new arenas of combat or 
authorize strategic and tactical missions without waiting around 
for Congress to debate the pros and cons of the action. This 
allows split second reaction to critical events. It seems very 
prescient indeed that the framers included such stipulations 
in the Constitution, After all, with the relatively few 
representatives in Congress and slow troop movements of the 
late seventeen-hundreds, a system of Congressional approval 
for all actions could just about have been feasible. But imagine 
such a system today, with 535 members of Congress, world-wide 
power projection capabilities of our forces and the amazing
8
mobility and elusiveness which modern technology has brought 
us. Quick, decisive judgments are necessary and can best be 
made by one man, with brief advice from his panel of experts.
Thus is the nature of high-level decisions in our country. 
This type of decision-making can result in the saving of many 
lives, but it leaves our nation vulnerable too. We are at the 
mercy of a given presidents judgment. We all know that if 
some trigger-happy psychotic were in office, quick removal would 
be imminent. But what if a president were not very willing 
to negotiate with another country to settle disputes. What 
if he saw the United States military as a diplomatic weapon 
to be wielded whenever the outcome would favor the U.S.? This 
mindset must be tempting because, with the most powerful military 
on the planet, the outcome of just about any military conflict 
is almost assuredly going to favor the U.S. The danger with 
this type of diplomacy is that it presents the very real 
possibility of needlessly endangering American lives. If one 
holds, as most rational people do, that human life is the one 
thing which is most sacred, then the possibility of needless 
loss of life is disturbing. This is why it is necessary to 
identify those individuals who tend to lean toward possibly 
unnecessary use of the military and prevent them from having 
the opportunity to endanger lives. The first step in this 
identification process is to study past presidents to see if 
there exists any trends in the use of military force. This 
analysis must begin by classifying presidents as militarily
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active or militarily inactive.
The classification of any president! or any person for 
that matter, is always a difficult task. This study examines 
the presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson, Nixon, 
Carter, and Reagan. Kennedy and Ford will not be examined 
because their terms of office were so short that it is difficult 
to get a clear picture of their intentions militarily. Some 
of these men led our nation during war, some during pseudo wars 
(undeclared wars), some during relative world peace and most 
during international political unrest. Because of these varied 
and incomparable conditions, I will try to identify trends in 
military involvement in order to classify the presidents as 
militarily active or militarily inactive. In other words, I 
will attempt to identify the general mood of the presidency 
under each of the chief executive officers in question. This 
will allow a fair comparison of these men even though they each 
faced very different national and international conditions. 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
Franklin Roosevelt was handed the reigns of the presidency 
by Herbert Hoover at what turned out to be the beginning of 
the Great Depression, Roosevelt saw a nation facing 25% 
unemployment figures and a New York Stock Exchange worth only 
one-quarter of its value only four years earlier in 1929. The 
first order of business was to shore up the failed banking 
industry. The subsequent creation of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation eased the public's fears of failing banks
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losing the people's savings* Roosevelt's New Deal concentrated 
on placing America on its economic feet again and that was 
clearly the first order of business for his administration*
Not as important, but nonetheless vital, was Roosevelt's 
intentions in the realm of international affairs, especially 
military intentions* During his campaign in 1932, Roosevelt 
campaigned on what seemed to be an isolationist policy of not 
entering the League of Nations.1 This impression, however, 
proved to be false as Roosevelt extended diplomatic relations 
to the Soviet Union, implemented the Good Neighbor policy in 
Central America and repudiated the "belligerent corollary" 
Theodore Roosevelt had attached in 1904 to the Monroe Doctrine, 
asserting the claim of the United States to exercise
2international police power in the western hemisphere* In 1935, 
a Democrat-led and Roosevelt-led Congress passed the Neutrality 
Act which imposed a mandatory embargo on arms shipment to all
3belligerent nations* The election of 1940 saw Roosevelt 
campaign on a platform of not entering the already begun World 
War II*
Even though Roosevelt occupied the presidency through most 
of World War II, it doesn't seem that he can be considered a 
militarily active president* As stated earlier, the object 
here is not co simply count up military encounters under the 
individual presidents, but rather to obtain a feel for the 
general mood of the presidential office during each of the 
administrations* Any president would have had to enter the
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war after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor and such action, 
as well as subsequent actions leading to the winning of the 
war must be attributed to the conditions of the war and the 
nature of warfare itself. Thus it seems that the propensity 
of a president to engage in military action cannot be determined 
by the United States' entrance into ant activities related to 
World War II because just about anyone would have had to react 
in a similar fashion.
Therefore, it seems proper to place Franklin Roosevelt 
in the category of militarily inactive. As explained above, 
even though he sat in office during the bloodiest war in this 
planet's history, his foreign policy stance and actions prior 
to the war were benign in their nature. It may seem paradoxioal 
to place a president whose administration conceived the atom 
bomb in such a category, but war is, as they say, hell, and 
once in the devilish affair the best one can do is try to get 
out.
HARRY S. TRUMAN
Growing up in small-town Independence, Missouri, Harry 
Truman seemed content to farm and live out his life in his home 
state. Truman entered public life in in 1934, running 
successfully for the United States Senate defeating four 
candidates in the primary, and easing into the Senate without 
much fanfare. In fact, President Roosevelt took almost two 
weeks to invite the new senator to the White House and when 
Truman finally arrived to greet Roosevelt, he was only allowed
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seven minutes to meet with the President* It appears that
Roosevelt disliked Truman because he considered him part of
the patronage and gaft machine of Kansas City Democratic Party
4iioss Tom Pendergast.
Truman almost stumbled into the presidency, coming into 
office at the death of Roosevelt after being sought by Democratic 
Party higher-ups for the vice-presidential slot because of 
Roosevelt's falling health* Truman's expertise lay in the realm 
of domestic politics and his ignorance of international affairs 
was his Achilles heel* He learned quickly on the job, though, 
and the results of his decisions are what will categorize him 
here.
One generally thinks of Truman as the president who dropped 
the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki* This alone would 
suffice for some people as justification for placing him in 
the category of militarily active. This, however needs to be 
studied closer to be certain.
The bombing of the two Japanese cities caused the immediate 
loss of approximately 100,000 civilian lives, an atrocity to 
be sure. But had Truman not used the bombs, there would have 
been a estimated 250,000 to 500,000 American lives lost in an
5attempt to take mainland Japan. Given the almost 2.6 billion 
dollars that he government had spent developing the bomb, it 
seems that a possibly unavoidable loss of so many American lives 
would have impeached Truman.
Even if one does not condemn Truman to the militarily active
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category for the use of atomic weapons, there are other factors 
which seem to point in that direction. Truman's basic program 
in foreign policy was a three-pronged one. It was composed 
of; the Truman Doctrine, which broadly stated that we would 
do all within our power to halt the spread of communism anywhere 
in the world; the Marshall Plan, which was basically an economic 
assistance plan for Western Europe; and the formation of NATO.
Of the three plans, two are directly related to the use of 
military force in the future and the broadly stated Truman 
Doctrine was the justification to enter the Korean theater, 
which ultimately cost over 33,000 American lives. Truman was 
not so pro-military that he supported MacArthur's desires to 
use nuclear weapons against North Korea and China, but he seems 
to fall somewhat clearly into the category of militarily active. 
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
After graduating from West Point, Eisenhower rose quickly 
within the military establishment. Beginning with work in the 
Panama Canal, he accelerated through the Army War College and 
Command and General Staff School, arriving as chief aide to 
Douglas MacArthur in 1933. Nine years later, he commanded the 
American invasion of North Africa, and by early 1943 had been 
promoted to supreme commander of Allied Forces in Europe.* 
Eisenhower was clearly one of the greatest military tacticians 
of World War II and one of the greatest in American history.
His subsequent rise to the presidency was well supported by 
the American public and he remains the only president to
14
substantially retain high effectiveness ratings for the duration 
of his term of office.
As a president, however, Eisenhower appeared not as the
powerful Nazi-defeating general, but rather low-keyed and
militarily restrained. The end of the Korean conflict came
about shortly after Eisenhower took office in 1953 and the
remainder of his term seems fairly sedate in retrospect. Unrest
in Eastern Europe, culminating in the Hungarian Uprising, as
well as military exchanges between U.S. allies France and Britain
and the Nassar-led Egypt provided ample opportunity for
Eisenhower to commit troops, but he chose to restrain himself.
The sending of army troops to Little Rock, Arkansas to quiet
the anti-integration protests and the brief commitment of marines
to Lebanon at the request of Lebanon's president stand as the
only two examples of calling the military to duty during the
Eisenhower years. Additionally, the passage of the so-called
Eisenhower Doctrine stipulated that, due to the power vacuum
in the Middle East, the U.S. could send troops with congressional
approval to any state in the Middle East which requested 
7assistance. The object was to deter Soviet aggression in the 
region while leaving the final decision to send troops to the 
president and to the country in question. Eisenhower only 
resorted to this once (Lebanon) and in fact used the same 
doctrine to justify not involving the U.S. in the 
Britain/France-Egypt conflict.
Eisenhower seems to have been quite restrained in his use
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of the military, although the threat of a powerful U.S. military 
surely assisted him by providing some degree of deterrent effect. 
Nonetheless, he was restrained in his actions and for that reason 
must be placed in the category of a militarily inactive 
president.
LYNDON B. JOHNSON
Lyndon Johnson took office in November, 1963, amid the 
turmoil of Kennedy's assassination. He quickly sought to pass 
civil rights legislation begun by his predecessor, which was 
accomplished quickly. He then unveiled his ow*i agenda for the 
nation, henceforth known as the Great Society. His plan called 
for the creation of VISTA, the Job Corps, the Office of Economic 
Opportunity and Head Start programs, with the goal being help 
to the hard-core poor and those who were considered to be
o
culturally disadvantaged. The conception of these and similar 
programs have led historians to view Johnson as a benevolent 
and caring leader on the domestic front. But he inherited 
one rather small problem from the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
administrations which proved to be his downfall and which will 
serve as the foundation for his classification here.
The Johnson administration was born with Vietnam in its 
lap. Sixteen thousand troops were based in the Southeast Asian 
country the day Johnson took office. Johnson's resolve to defend 
democracy from the evils of communism lead to an involvement 
which seemed to spiral ever deeper into the realm of U.S. 
involvement. It seems ironic that, in 1964, Johnson campaigned
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against Senator Barry Goldwater on the premise that Johnson
possessed “restraint and judgment in military matters [which]
9could be relied upon/' Four years later, that restraint and
judgment effectively precluded Johnson from even attempting
to seek his own party's nomination*
The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was passed by Congress to
allow the president to react to situations in the Vietnamese
region which might endanger U.S. troops there, was quite similar
in purpose to the resolution extended to Eisenhower for operation
in the Middle East* Unlike Eisenhower, however, Johnson ended
up relying on the Tonkin Resolution to ferry more and more troops
and supplies to South Vietnam. Johnson seemed stuck in the
Vietnam quagmire, If he were to continue to send troops, he
would surely face growing opposition at home, but if ho removed
the U.S. forces from the region, South Vietnam would most
assuredly fall to the Communists. Johnson was afraid of the
“domino theory", that is if one South East Asian nation fell
1 0to communism, then others would follow. The decision to 
escalate the war is the decision that places Johnson in the 
militarily active category. Even though he was duly restrained 
in other parts of the world, most notably in Central America, 
his raising the level of U.S. involvement in Vietnam from 10,000 
to 525,000 in just over four years, even over the growing 
opposition from Congress and the general public, justly 
identifies Johnson as a president with a rather high propensity 
to resort to the military to solve problems.
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RICHARD M. NIXON
Richard Nixon entered the office of the President of the 
United States with the nation still deep in the muck of the 
Vietnam War. His criticism of the previous administration *s 
policies in the Asian theater of operations won him some support 
from the general public, enough to squeak by in the election 
with a less than ideal 43 percent of the overall vote. While 
this v/as enough to place him in office, it was hardly the type 
of "mandate*' which presidents 30 often refer to for support 
of their policies. Nevertheless, Nixon had voiced a desire 
to "Vietnamize" the war, that is hand over more and more of 
the defense responsibility to the people of South Vietnam, and 
he intended to follow through with that plan.
Intentions, as we all know, are not always reflected in
the actions of men, and so was the case with Nixon's
Vietnamization plans for the war. While he did pull massive
amounts of U.S. troops from the region, he escalated the air
war to prevent the North Vietnamese from running roughshot over
its weak neighbor to the south. This escalation of the air
war led to the bombing of Cambodia and the ravaging of many
areas in the North due to constant "carpet bombing" and
11deforestation. And although many troops were removed, the 
ones which remained took on new responsibilities due to new 
ground incursions into Cambodia. The response back home was 
one of renewed protest and in May of 1970, National guardsmen 
who were controlling a protest at Kent State opened fire on
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a crowd killing four protesters. Peace negotiations floundered 
about during the period 1970-1972 and just when Henry Kissinger 
announced that "peace was at hand", the South Vietnamese objected 
to the cease fire terms and Nixon stalled the agreement. He 
subsequently ordered massive bombings to resume in North Vietnam 
and this order came through just after his re-election in 1972.
Although Nixon campaigned on a platform of undoing the 
Vietnam mess, it remained nothing more than a campaign promise 
and was never realized to any significant extent. Nixon did, 
however, make impressive strides in diplomatic relations with 
China and succeeded in concluding the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks (SALT I) with the Soviet Union. It is obvious that these 
diplomatic successes continue to have profound effects on the 
state of U.S. relations with these and other countries, but 
this is a study in military use and in that light Nixon must 
be classified as a militarily active president.
JAMBS E« CARTER
Jimmy Carter can best be described as an unfortunate 
president. He entered office just as the economic backlash 
of the early 19705s oil embargo was beginning to take its toll 
on other aspects of the U.S. economy and his name has become 
synonymous with inflation and stagflation to the average 
American.
In events dealing with the military, too, Carter has been 
effectively portrayed as a man who weakened the U.S. military 
to the point of making the nation extremely vulnerable to attack
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with a very limited ability to defend itself. This perception 
has been largely created by other politicians hoping to gain 
from Carter*s failures, but it is grounded in truth. It is 
true that Carter canceled the B~1 bomber program and sought 
to reduce the shipbuilding activity in favor of alternate, and 
sometimes non-defense related, programs. But he also favored
the strengthening of NATO and the development of the neutron
1 2bomb. However, he then teetered back and forth on the decision 
to go ahead with neutron bomb research and confused observers 
as to what his true military Intentions were.
While we can speculate endlessly as to the intentions of 
Carter in the area of military development, we can easily 
quantify his actions. The simple fact is that the United States 
military was unusually free from encounters with hostile forces 
while Carter remained in office. The lone incident involving 
the attempted rescue of the hostages in Iran stands as the 
isolated event in which military action was used as a means 
to accomplish a diplomatic goal, and this came only after 
embargoes and freezing Iranian assets in the U.S. accomplished 
no resolution to the situation. Carter's term seems to be 
littered with attempts to bridge diplomatic chasms by use of 
bargaining and the power of the pen in the form of treaties. 
Egyptian-Isreai* negotiations, the failed SALT II treaty, the 
recognition of the Peoples Republic of China as the only China 
(ending the relations with Taiwan) and the boycotting/embargo 
situations which followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
20
all paint a picture of a president who sought to use the military 
to attain goals only as an absolute last resort. It is because 
of this that Jimmy Carter must be classified as a militarily 
inactive president.
RONALD W. REAGAN
Ronald Reagan rode into the White House astride the crushing 
defeat he had dealt Jimmy Carter in November of 1980, The former 
actor played upon the economic woes of the nation under Carter 
and the perception of a v*. ak military which had come into 
existence under his pre 1. -ssor. He possessed a charisma and 
an ability to relate to all types of Americans which has only 
been rivaled by Franklin Roosevelt. Reagan promised a better 
economy, and he delivered. He also promised a stronger military 
with "peace through strength" being the rallying cry for his 
military program. The question stands, however, have we really 
achieved peace through our newfound strength?
Quite obviously we are not at war, so by that criteria
we have indeed achieved peace through strength. But if one
accepts the notion that we can be a society not at peace without
going to war, then the question opens up for debate. In 1983,
the United States initiated a brief exercise in bombing foreign
targets when Reagan authorized the bombing of key strategic
13positions in Lebanon. Shortly thereafter, U.S. marines invaded 
1 4Grenada. Two years later in 1985, American FB-111s based 
out of England attacked the home of Libyan leader Muammar Quadafy 
in retaliation for terrorist actions carried out against
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Americans which were linked to Libya. The United States also 
took an active role in the Persian Gulf by sending an entire 
fleet of naval vessels to the gulf to protect reflagged Kuwaiti 
oil tankers. Due to the American presence in the gulf, U.S. 
lives were lost when an Iraqi F«4 (curiously made in and sold 
by the U.S.) accidentally mistook the U.S.S. Stark for an oil 
tanker and fired upon it. A similar accident occurred some 
months later when the crew of the U.S.S. Vincennes mistook an 
Iranian passenger jet for an Iranian F~14 (also produced in 
the U.S.) and downed it with a missile, killing all of the 
approximately 290 passengers aboard. These events, in addition 
to the vehe >nt support of the Contra rebels in Nicaragua by 
the Reagan administration seem to cast some doubt as to the 
level of peace we have obtained during the Reagan years.
We certainly have not entered into another Korea or Vietnam 
(although some will point to Nicaragua and insist we are headed 
in that direction), but peace is a relative term and for a nation 
who is not at war, we have succeeded in keeping the military 
machine well-oiled and broken in. It is the situation when 
viewed in this light that dictates Reagan be classified as a 
militarily active president.
SUMMARY
The presidents have now been classified and the 
classifications are to be examined for consistencies among the 
members of the respective categories. Roosevelt, Elsenhower 
and Carter comprise the militarily inactive group while Truman,
22
Johnson, Nixon and Reagan fall into the militarily active 
category. It deserves mention that the political affiliation 
of the groups is a mixed bag with both parties being represented 
in both categories. This is significant because it forces the 
conscientious voter to look past simple party affiliation to 
make a reasonable decision about a presidents propensity to 
use the military.
The cases of Roosevelt and Reagan need to be briefly 
addressed because of an apparent inconsistency in their 
classification. It seems altogether paradoxical that a president 
whose term saw the United States engaged in the greatest war 
the planet has ever seen be placed in the militarily inactive 
group while a president in office during no major wars be placed 
alongside the militarily active presidents. However, as stated 
before, peace is indeed a relative term and, as previously 
explained, a president must be judged not merely by the quantity 
of militarily significant events occurring during his term, 
but by the conditions present in the world during his terra as 
well. That being the case, it seems fitting that these men reside 
in these respective groups.
The following chapters will focus of some possible 
explanations for the activeness or inactiveness of these 
presidents in hopes of finding some predictive characteristics.
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CHAPTER 2; Budgeting For war And Peace
So, now that we know who the military and non-military 
presidents are, what factors can we look at about each president 
which could possibly serve as an indicator when evaluating future 
presidents? One rather obvious factor is each president's level 
of funding for the military, and that is the focus of this 
chapter.
It seems rather sensible that if a president was making 
a conscious decision to use the power of the United States 
military at some point in the future, he would want to make 
sure that that military was sufficient to almost ensure victory 
by the very nature of its size and strength. The best analogy 
is that of a safari hunter preparing to go off on safari in 
Africa in search of lions, tigers, elephants and whatever else 
happened to be there. The hunter wants to prove he is king 
of the jungle so-to-speak. If he only possessed a pocket-knife 
with which to conduct his safari, chances are he would head 
to the local Safaris Are Us to stock up on the essential elephant 
guns and tranquilizer darts so his chances of bagging his game 
and simultaneously remaining alive would be enhanced.
The same type of reasoning applies here. If a given 
president were to consciously decide to go out and be "king 
of the jungle" he would make sure the U.S. military were in 
top shape. That is why an examination of the budgeting practices 
of the presidents can offer some insight into the question of
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whether or not the military propensity of a president is a fact 
of conscious decision and will. If not, then the military 
propensity must come from some subconscious belief system formed 
by outside factors.
Chart 1 (page 26) graphically illustrates the amount of 
defense spending in the United States, represented as a 
percentage of the federal budget for that year, from Roosevelt*s 
first budget in 1935 to Reagan * s fiscal year 1989 budget. As 
one can clearly see, the graph exhibits a rough approximation 
of a bell curve with the apex of the curve occurring during 
the Eisenhower years. This is excepting the large spike 
representing World War II during the Roosevelt years. The 
exception of this spike is necessary because the United States 
was pulled into the war by forces beyond the control of Roosevelt 
and his administration. In World War II, the U.S. was engaged 
in the most serious war with the most dire consequences it had 
ever seen. This situation may justify the levels of funding 
given to the defense effort (exceeding 90% of the entire federal 
budget for several years), but it also serves to distort the 
figures for this study and is therefore not seriously considered 
viable data. The same argument could be made of the Vietnam 
and Korean conflicts but to a much lesser degree. Additionally, 
the Vietnam and Korean conflicts were conscious decisions to 
enter the theater of operations and the very homeland of the 
United States was not attacked or even in danger.
That aside, the budgeting of the various presidents seems
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to say that no specific correlation exists between the budgeting 
of the presidents and their respective active or inactive 
categories* For instance, Roosevelt and Carter, two of the 
three militarily inactive presidents, find themselves on either 
end to the curve and with budgeting levels for defense lower 
than those of the other presidents. Remember, this is not 
considering Roosevelt'3 few years during World War II when 
funding spiked at the 90% level. It would, therefore, make 
a very nice conclusion to categorically state that presidents 
with very low relative levels of funding for defense, in relation 
to the overall budget, are ones who could be considered 
militarily inactive. The one small problem with this statement 
is the presence of the Eisenhower administration right at the 
peak of the funding curve.
While it is possible that Eisenhower stands as an exception, 
there seems to be a more plausible explanation for the 
positioning of the curve and the presidents along it. Consider 
that the Roosevelt administration came into being during the 
great depression and, even though Hitler was already rising 
to power, had more important things to do than to build a large 
defense. Carter, on the other hand, came into office with 
Vietnam fresh in the minds of every American. Additionally 
rising inflation and Carter's commitment to energy research 
and conservation plus his commitment to improving human rights 
around the world focused attention in areas other than the 
military. Eisenhower, it seems, along with several other
presidents of his era (and level of funding on the graph) seems 
to have been caught in the paranoia which swept the decade of 
the 1950s concerning communism and the Communist possession 
of the atomic bomb. This paranoia, fueled by Senator Joe 
McCarthy, sent a panic throughout the public and Congress, 
necessitating the security blanket effect of massive military 
spending. The domestic situation during the Eisenhower years 
made this security blanket possible because the economy was 
rolling along smoothly and the pressure for large scale social 
programs was still about a decade in the future. It seems rather 
doubtful that any meaningful relationship can exist between 
the budgeting of the militarily inactive presidents and their 
classification as being militarily inactive.
The militarily active presidents also exhibit no set pattern 
of budgeting for defense. They run the gamut from the rise 
in defense budgets under Truman to the fall in the same budgets 
under Johnson and Nixon. Again, it seems that the threat of 
communism and Communist expansion in the late 1940s and 1950s 
fueled the desire for large amounts of defense spending.
Likewise, the long, protracted war in Vietnam soured the public 
on military excursions in general, forcing a redirection in 
funds and energies for a society with a changed world outlook.
In conclusion, it seems that the two undeclared wars of 
the modern era, Korea and Vietnam, bracket in a timeframe during 
which military spending was sustained at the relatively high 
level of about 53-54% of the total budget. What seems to be
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important about this is the fact that this time frame encompasses 
both militarily active and militarily Inactive presidents.
It is because of this phenomenon that one must conclude that 
militarily active presidents do not make a conscious effort 
to increase military strength so that operations can be carried 
out with a greater degree of success. It logically follows 
that since no conscious effort towards military use seems to 
exist on the part of either the active or the inactive 
presidents, some factors are at work which have instilled, at 
a subconscious level, a pro-military or anti-military approach 
to achieving diplomatic goals. Some possible factors which 
could be at work are the focus of the following chapters.
CHAPTER 3: How Pergonal Experience Reflects On A President*g
Military Actions
As has already been demonstrated in chapter 2, it seems 
that conscious efforts to be a pro-military president do not 
exist to any great degree in our highest office. So there must 
be other factors, most likely working at a subconscious level, 
which cause a president to lean more or less in the direction 
of military use. The introduction to this endeavor, if you 
will recall, presented the notion that a man is the product 
of his past life experiences. Each event or condition to which 
he is exposed acts in some way to shape and mold his character 
and his way of thinking. If this is accepted as a plausible 
hypothesis, then it would logically follow that there must be 
some experiences in a president's past which have helped to 
mold that president's views on the military and its use, This 
is the assumption which will provide the foundation for the 
rest of the research into this matter. In this chapter, three 
aspects of an individual's past which could reasonably have 
a profound effect on attitudes towards military use will be 
discussed. They are the personal military exposure and training 
of the presidents, the socio-economic environment in which they 
were raised and the type and level of education which they 
possessed
Military Exposure and Training
The exposure to the military and military training must 
be examined in terms of quality, as well as quantity, to have
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any real meaning. This point will be expanded on shortly. 
However, a quick look at just the rank level of military 
achievement of each president shows some interesting trends. 
Table 1 illustrates the highest rank achieved by the respective 
presidents.
TABLE 1
PRESIDENT HIGHEST RANK
Franklin Roosevelt ............... No Military Experience
Harry Truman.......... ................ Captain
Dwight Eisenhower ............... General of the Army
Lyndon Johnson .......................  Lieutenant
Richard Nixon . . . . . . . . . . . .  Lieutenant
Jimmy Carter .....................Lt. Commander
Ronald Reagan .........................  Private
(Source; Who's Who in America. 1988-1989)
Close examination of the table reveals that none of the
militarily active presidents had experience at a field grade
level. A field grade officer is an officer of at least the
rank of major. The significance of a field grade officer is
that it is the level at which vital decisions take place.
Officers below this level, while still important, serve more
of an administrative function than an important decision making
function. Field grade officers are much more "in the know"
as far as planning goes and are responsible for considerably
more men and equipment than are lesser officers.
In comparison, the militarily inactive presidents, with
the exception of Roosevelt, show very significant experience
at a much higher rank. Eisenhower, clearly the most militarily
accomplished of our leaders in modern history, was a graduate
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of West Point and a career military man. Carter also intended 
to be a career military officer and his closest friends say
1 3he had his sights set on becoming Chief of Naval Operations.
Roosevelt stands as the Ion© exception, but in this case 
its seems proper that the Roosevelt case be treated as an 
exception rather than proof that no correlation exists between 
personal military experience and propensity to use the military. 
The skeptic may be quick to point out that, in the previous 
chapter, the non-conformity of the Eisenhower case was reason 
enough to dismiss budgeting as a possible related factor to 
military use. This, however, is not entirely true. It is true 
that in both the budgeting and the military experience 
discussions, two militarily inactive presidents followed a 
similar trend while the third did not. But the third president 
bucking the trend was not the only cause for dismissal of the 
budgetary correlation. The cause was a combination of that 
fact as well as the fact that the militarily active presidents 
followed no coherent trend either. The personal experience 
factor, on the other hand, gives us two trends, one, broken 
only by Roosevelt, is that presidents with significant military 
experience above the level of a field-grade officer seem to 
be restrained in committing troops of hostile situations. The 
second and crucial trend, which lends a degree of validity to 
this correlation, is that the militarily active presidents, 
without exception, do not possess field-grade military 
experience. It is the existence of these two mirror-like trends
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which allows us to simultaneously see Roosevelt as an exception
and allow the claim of correlation between personal military
experience and propensity to use the military seem quite valid.
Finally, it deserves mention that Roosevelt was Assistant
1 4Secretary of the Navy during the Wilson Administration. It 
seems quite possible that this degree of high level exposure 
to military decision making served Roosevlt in a manner similer 
to the field grade officer experience of the other militarily 
inactive presidents.
Even more validation of this correlation presents itself
when the quality of the military careers is examined. For
instance, the military careers of the the militarily active
presidents looks even more far removed from those of the inactive
presidents when you look at what they actually did and how long
they served, Truman, the most militarily accomplished of the
group, had only four years of experience. Johnson, meanwhile,
served only six months of active duty and that was while he
was in Congress 1 The idea of an attempt to make himself and
Congress look good by symbolically saying "I would ask you to
do nothing I wouldn’t do myself” seems to quickly come to mind.
This seems especially suspect when one considers that Johnson
was awarded the Silver Star for gallantry in action just because
1 5the plane he was in was shot at. Not hit, just shot at.
Nixon, while serving for almost four years, attained the rank 
of lieutenant junior grade in the Navy, which is equivalent
i t  4* 4 r
to a 1 lieutenant in the Army, not close to field grade.
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Reagan was not only not an officer but made training films for
17the Army for three years during World War II.
These records of military accomplishment pale in comparison 
to Eisenhower's duties as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe 
and Carter's work as a student of Admiral Hyman Kickover, who 
is considered the father of today's nuclear Navy. Therefore, 
it does seem that quality, high level experience in the military 
is a characteristic of militarily inactive presidents while 
a lack of the same seems to point to a militarily active 
president.
Socio-Economic and Educational Backgrounds
The question of whether or not the socio-economic upbringing 
of the presidents has any correlational value to their use of 
the military appears, at least initially, to be a reasonable 
one. In today's society, people are quick to point out that 
if a leader elected to public office has come from a privileged 
background that he cannot identify with the "common folk" and 
therefore cannot be as effective in creating policies which 
will be favorable to the common, everyday American. Americans 
seem to be very wary of finding themselves in a situation where 
they feel they are being ruled by anything resembling an 
aristocracy. Just last year, Michael Dukakis touted his own 
heritage as the son of immigrants and poked fun at George Bush 
for being a sheltered, Ivy Leaguer. The effect was to portray 
Dukakis as an average American and at the same time painting 
a picture of an almost aristocratic George Bush, distanced from
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mainstream society.
It is just such an identification which raises the question 
of socio-economic background and its effects on the actions 
of the presidents. Are the Dukakises* of the world correct in 
stating that an Ivy League* upbringing produces ivy League 
policies? Or is this notion simply a variation on deso iptivr 
representation which tends to have no significant policy effect j?
Before tackling this problem, a brief description of the 
underlying "common man" theory must take place. Basically, 
the common man theory states that the military is populated 
to a great extent by your average, garden variety American.
Among the fighting men that crawl through the mud, land on the 
beaches and give their lives so that the goals of the Uni ted 
States may be realized around the world, the vast majority are 
not college educated and certainly not of Ivy League stock. 
According to those who place faith in the common man theory, 
it logically follows that if you have a man of privileged 
upbringing in office, a member oi the elite of American society 
if you will, then the policies which come from such an 
administration will be elitist in nature and will not be 
favorable to the ordinary man. An example of this line of 
thinking is in the uproar over income taxes. Many people 
perceive the Republicans, many of whom are not members of the 
lower socio-economic classes, as supporting tax policies which 
favor the wealthy and big business. Blue-collar Democrats charge 
that these Republicans are placing the bulk of the tax burden
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on the poorer people of the nation and supporting policies which 
favor their cwn kind, the relatively wealthy.
If this type of reasoning is indeed accurate, then it could 
be applied to the case of the military use by a president as 
well en taxation policies. The common man theory states that 
elected leaders will look out for the common man's interests 
only if the leader himself also comes from a background which 
is similar to the ordinary American's. Since the enlisted 
personnel, the backbone of the military establishment, are mostly 
non-college educated men and women, one would expect the leaders 
with less education to be less likely to expose the common man 
to warfare (assuming he had other options to deal with the 
situation). In addition to education, the general socio-economic 
background of the presidents must parallel that of the general 
soldier in our armed forces. Ag^in, along with little or no 
college education, moot (but certain’, y not all) of our men in 
uniform are from working class backgrounds. The Army even 
exploits this fact in its recruiting campaigns by stating that 
a three-year stint in service can help the young high school 
graduate stash away some money so that he can pay for college 
later, Implying that the majority of people who enter the Army 
cannot afford to pay for college themselves. How many wealthy 
"elitists" cannot afford to pay for college?
So according to this common man approach to looking at 
the military use issue, presidents who are militarily inactive 
should be from a relatively common socio-economic background
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and have little college level education. But not many presidents 
in the modern era have no college level education. Therefore 
we must extend the common man supporters to include presidents 
whose education took place in public institutions as opposed 
to private ones. This seems logical because most public 
institutions are accessible to a greater number of people and 
are much less expensive than their private counterparts. This 
would allow the president much more exposure to a more 
representative sample of Americans which should keep the common 
man theory intact.
The fact is, this theory simply is not valid in the case 
of the presidents and military use. The modern presidents 
examined here are a mixed bag, both educationally and socio­
economically. But when you divide them into their respective 
militarily active and inactive categories, it becomes evident 
quite quickly that not only does a trend not exist which would 
support the common man theory of representation, but that no 
trend seems to exist at all which would support any theory about 
representation. Table 2 lists the educational and socio-economic 
backgrounds of the presidents in this study.
TABLE 2
PRESIDENT
Poose/elt
Truman
Eisenhower
COLLEGE LEVEL EDUCATION 
Private (Harvard)
None
U.S. Mil. Acad.-West Point 
Public (S.W. Texas)
Private (Whittier; Duke) 
U.S. Naval Acad.-Annapolis 
Private (Eureka)
Wealthy""
Farmer
Modest
Modest
Merchant
Farmer*
Modest*
BACKGROUND
Johnson
Nixon
Carter
Reagan
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*Both Carter and Reagan became millionaires later in life
(Sources; Who's Who in JUerica, 1968-1989; THE PRESIDENTS? A 
REFERENCE HISTORY, by Fanry F. Graff)
The militarily inactive presidents, Roosevelt, Eisenhower 
and Carter, represent the most elite of private schools (Harvard) 
and two of the three service academies. Additionally, one began 
life wealthy, one remained a man of somewhat modest means as 
a career military officer, and one began life somewhat modestly 
and went on to become a millionaire.
The militarily active presidents, v i n o , shoot the common 
man theory clear out of the water. None of them began life 
wealthy, and only Reagan attained sizable wealth while he was 
still somewhat young. What's more, two of the presidents in 
this category fall into the educational group which should be 
friends of the common man (Truman had no advanced education 
and Johnson attended public schools) while none of the militarily 
inactive presidents had similar educational backgrounds.
It seems that the idea of descriptive representation as 
it applies to education, socio-economic background and the 
propensity to use the military does not hold water in the case 
of the modern presidents. Many political scientists have long 
held that descriptive representation, while seeming logical 
to the general public, is not an accurate theory and should 
be generally dismissed. The facts, as presented abov?v seem 
to concur with that assessment.
Summary
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This chapter has examined three factors of presidential 
pasts in an attempt to understand whether or not those factors 
had altered or molded the personalities of the men to the degree 
that they would be more or.less likely to commit the U.S. 
military to hostile activities. To the casual observer, the 
military experience of the presidents, the socio-economic and 
the educational aspect of the president's past seem as though 
they could offer some clue or lend some predictive quality to 
the quest for identifying militarily prone presidents. As often 
happens in life, however, common sense is simply not borne out 
by the facts. The facts seem to be that only the military 
experience of the presidents can offer any real insight into 
the military mindedness o* a president. But one must examine 
the military experience carefully, noting not only the time 
served, but the rank achieved as well as the demonstrated 
commitment to really understanding the complexities of the United 
States military, such as with Carter and Eisenhower both 
intending to be career officers. Only when the inquiry is 
approached in this manner can the results possess and predictive 
qualities.
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CONCLUSION: What Have We Learned?
In the beginning of this endeavor, it was states that there 
was a real need for research into this kind of topic because 
it would allow society to learn of factors which are common 
to certain types of people and make decisions based on this 
data. If we knew what caused mass murderers to commit their 
crimes, or could even simply establish links between experiences 
and certain types of crimes, then we would have discovered a 
rudimentary ability to predict actions. This ability would 
be quite useful in all facets of life. Whether it be spotting 
potential mass murders or spotting militarily active presidents, 
we all would be better off.
The question now stands, are we any closer to being able 
to predict, with any degree of confidence at all, what a person 
will do? Although wc may still not know why certain presidents 
are more prone to use the military more often than others, we 
have seemingly found one factor of presidential character which 
is a fairly reliable indicator. As expressed previously, that 
factor is the personal military experience of the president 
in question. The other factors examined here, budgeting, socio­
economic background and educational exposure, seem not to be 
directly linkable to a president's military use. We have, 
however, reinforced the idea that a man is indeed a product 
of his life experiences, but we are only slightly closer to 
understanding which of.those experiences are relevant to which
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actions* It is quite possible that factors such as the 
presidents' socio-economic or educational backgrounds could 
indeed be important signals for some other type of action, but 
that will be for some other author to determine* For now, we 
have one factor which seems to have some predictive ability.
The question of why a lack of sufficient exposure to the 
military seems to produce a president more apt to use armed 
forces to resolve conflict is one which can only be speculated 
upon* One answer could be that the men with the most exposure 
to the military have developed a perception of the military 
as more than just a faceless machine. It is possible that the 
time they spent in the service served to give them an 
understanding of the military as a group of men, women and 
machines who are not infallible or undefeatable and therefore 
are not a sure-fire answer problems* The flip side of this 
idea would be that men with little or no military experience 
would tend to be in awe of the military establishment without 
fully understanding it. They therefore would be much more likely 
that they would see the military as being capable of settling 
almost any dispute it needed to. All of this, however, is only 
speculation because of the nature of the question* Thankfully, 
we do not need to know why something works for it to work*
Just as we do not fully understand why electricity works, we 
know that it does behave in certain predictable ways and it 
is because of those predictable behaviors that we can use it 
to our own advantage* While it is not being suggested that
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we understand presidential motives as well as we understand 
electricity, it does seem that we have stumbled onto a factor 
which allows us to predict with some confidence at least one 
aspect of presidential behavior.
The idea of predictive ability leads us to our final task 
in this endeavor. That task being to look at the current 
President of the United States, George H.W. Bush, and see what 
our data will predict for the military during the Bush 
administration. To do this we will, naturally, look at the 
military exposure of George Bush.
George Bush entered the military at the onset of World
War IX. He served four years, attained the rank of lieutenant
junior grade in the Navy as a fighter pilot and was discharged
honorably. In addition, he was awarded three service medals
1 8for gallantry, bravery and distinguished flying. Certainly 
a military career that anyone would be proud of. But within 
the context of our study here, this information presents some 
cause for worry.
First of all, Bush did not attain what seems to be that 
mystical rank of a field grade officer. As you will recall 
from chapter 3, all presidents who fell below that level, with 
the exception of Roosevelt (who had no military experience) 
were classified a militarily active. This does not present 
a pleasant picture for the years ahead. When you look at he 
quality of Bush's time in the service, e little relief, though 
not much is found. While Bush seems to possess the one "fatal
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gene11 which is so common among the militarily active presidents, 
he also soems to be the most militarily experienced of the group. 
Although not a career-minded military man, it is possible that 
his experience in vhe military was enough to teach him some 
of the limitations of our military. After All George Bush was 
* real war hero in World War II. It is possible that this 
intense exposure to war will affect Bush like high level military 
positions affected the militarily inactive presidents. We, 
however, cannot count on this hope to keep us out of military 
hostilities. So it must be predicted that the United States 
will indeed be engaged in military hostilities which could 
possibly be avoided if someone else had been elected in 1988.
Remember that a president is not considered to be militarily 
active if he was forced by the direct action of another country 
against the United States to commit U.S. troops. He is only 
condemned to that category if he decided to use the military 
when he had other reasonable and workable alternatives. This 
is the fate which is predicted for the United States under George 
Bush. We can only speculate, however, as to the heroic military 
leadership we could expect if Dan Quayle were to come into 
office.
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